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Paul Janet Quotes: Sources, Meanings & Themes

Browse quotations by Paul Janet with named works, context notes, meanings and recurring themes.

About the author

Context for this collection

1823–1899 · French philosopher and moralist

Common themes

Humility, self-respect, self-worth, dignity, modesty, duty, moral judgment and the distinction between virtue and self-abasement.

Source identified1
Remember that thou art a man and do not degrade thyself: this is self-respect.

“Remember that thou art a man and do not degrade thyself: this is self-respect.”

Janet treats human dignity as a floor below which humility should not push a person: recognizing weakness does not require degrading oneself or surrendering self-respect.

Source details

Elements of Morals, Chapter XIV, section 165, printed page 296, Caroline Rollin Corson’s 1884 English translation, Project Gutenberg #37016. “Remember that thou art a man and do not degrade thyself: this is self-respect” appears in the same paragraph as Janet’s paired reminder against vain pride, making self-respect and humility complementary parts of his moral argument rather than generic affirmation copy.

Source identified2
Humility should not be an abasement; for it is never a virtue in man to lower himself.

“Humility should not be an abasement; for it is never a virtue in man to lower himself.”

Janet sharply separates humility from self-degradation: accurate awareness of human weakness should coexist with dignity, so humility does not require pretending that one has no worth or abilities.

Source details

Elements of Morals, Chapter XIV, section 165, printed page 296, Caroline Rollin Corson’s 1884 English translation, Project Gutenberg #37016. Janet distinguishes humility from abasement: humility arises from recognition of human weakness, but lowering oneself is not itself a virtue. The passage belongs to nineteenth-century systematic moral philosophy rather than modern clinical self-esteem guidance.

Source identified3
If the principle of final causes were a first principle, and a priori, like the principle of causality, we would apply it everywhere and in all circumstances; but it is not so.

“If the principle of final causes were a first principle, and a priori, like the principle of causality, we would apply it everywhere and in all circumstances; but it is not so.”

Janet begins by denying that teleological explanation functions as an automatic first principle, making its use something that must itself be examined and justified.

Source details

Final Causes, Book I, Chapter I, “The Principle,” opening sentence, William Affleck translation (1878). The represented public-domain scan prints the sentence on p. 17 after Robert Flint’s prefatory matter. Janet begins by denying that finality functions as an automatic a priori principle like causality; this remains nineteenth-century philosophical teleology rather than current scientific consensus.