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“Remember that thou art a man and do not degrade thyself: this is self-respect.”
Janet treats human dignity as a floor below which humility should not push a person: recognizing weakness does not require degrading oneself or surrendering self-respect.
Source note: Elements of Morals, section 165, Caroline Rollin Corson translation, Project Gutenberg #37016. Janet immediately balances this with “Remember that thou art but a man” as the check against vain pride, making self-respect and humility complementary rather than opposites.
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“Humility should not be an abasement; for it is never a virtue in man to lower himself.”
Janet sharply separates humility from self-degradation: accurate awareness of human weakness should coexist with dignity, so humility does not require pretending that one has no worth or abilities.
Source note: Elements of Morals, section 165, Caroline Rollin Corson translation, Project Gutenberg #37016. Janet contrasts humility with false abasement and defines it alongside self-respect as an accurate estimate of both human weakness and human dignity.
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“The noble soul has reverence for itself.”
The line connects nobility with an inward standard of dignity rather than dependence on applause, rank, or approval from other people.
Source note: Beyond Good and Evil, section 287, Helen Zimmern translation; capitalization modernized from the source edition.
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“Otherwise, a man is the slave of what other people are pleased to think.”
Dependence on approval can turn other people’s judgments into a form of control; self-respect requires allowing outside opinion to inform rather than govern one’s sense of worth.
Source note: The Wisdom of Life; the sentence appears in Schopenhauer’s criticism of giving excessive weight to reputation and social opinion.
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“What a man is contributes much more to his happiness than what he has, or how he is regarded by others.”
Schopenhauer places personal character and inner constitution above possessions and reputation, making well-being depend more on what a person is than on external valuation.
Source note: The Wisdom of Life; T. Bailey Saunders’s public-domain translation distinguishes what a person is from possessions and from the opinions of other people.
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“And so the good man ought to be Self-loving: because by doing what is noble he will have advantage himself and will do good to others.”
Aristotle distinguishes a worthy form of self-love from selfish appetite: the good person values the rational and noble part of life in a way that benefits both the self and other people.
Source note: Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, Chapter VIII, Project Gutenberg #8438. The surrounding argument explicitly contrasts this noble “Self-loving” with the blameworthy form that grasps at wealth, honours and bodily pleasures, so the line is not a defense of simple selfishness.