10 quotations linked to The Theory of Moral Sentiments by or associated with Adam Smith, with source notes, explanations and related topics.
Sympathy, justice, self-judgment, humanity, truth, social trust, prudence, industry, habits and the moral emotions that Smith analyzes alongside self-interest.
Use these links when you want to inspect the wording in its wider work or edition.
“Humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved.”
Smith contrasts humane character with status-seeking by presenting affection and social trust, rather than greatness itself, as the fitting reward of humanity.
Source note: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III, in Smith’s discussion of the rewards commonly associated with industry, truth, justice, and humanity.
“Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice.”
The social metaphor makes justice structurally essential: Smith argues that a community may survive limited generosity but not continual mutual injury.
Source note: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part II, Section II, Chapter III; the sentence contrasts justice as society’s foundation with beneficence as its ornament.
“We run not only to congratulate the successful, but to condole with the afflicted.”
Shared life includes both celebration and consolation: Smith treats sympathetic participation in another person’s sorrow as a basic feature of social feeling.
Source note: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part I discussion of sympathy with joy and affliction; represented by the 1777 Dublin edition in Project Gutenberg #67363.
“It is not in being rich that truth and justice would rejoice, but in being trusted and believed.”
The passage separates moral reputation from wealth: truthfulness and justice seek the confidence of other people rather than riches as their characteristic reward.
Source note: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III; this sentence immediately follows Smith’s contrast between humanity seeking love and industry receiving external success.
“This self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the disorders of human life.”
Smith treats distorted self-judgment as a major moral problem because people can preserve flattering interpretations of conduct instead of examining themselves impartially.
Source note: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III, discussion of self-examination and the impartial spectator; Smith is describing the difficulty of judging one’s own conduct fairly.
“Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour.”
Smith distinguishes the minimum restraint required by justice from positive generosity: justice first prevents injury, even when it does not itself supply active beneficence.
Source note: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part II, Section II, discussion comparing justice with beneficence and the obligations that society may enforce.
“What is the reward most proper for encouraging industry, prudence, and circumspection? Success in every sort of business.”
Smith links practical success with habits of industry, prudence, and careful judgment, while treating that success as the characteristic external reward of those traits.
Source note: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III; Smith asks what rewards ordinarily encourage industry, prudence, truth, justice, and humanity.
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others.”
Smith opens his moral theory by arguing that human beings possess capacities for fellow-feeling even when another person’s welfare offers no material advantage.
Source note: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part I, Section I, Chapter I “Of Sympathy”; represented by Project Gutenberg’s 1777 Dublin edition.
“The habits of œconomy, industry, discretion, attention, and application of thought, are generally supposed to be cultivated from self-interested motives.”
Smith acknowledges that disciplined habits can arise from self-interest while still being socially praised for the steadiness, care, and practical competence they develop.
Source note: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part VI, Section II discussion of systems that make virtue consist in benevolence; historical spelling “œconomy” is retained.
“The rules of justice are accurate in the highest degree, and admit of no exceptions or modifications, but such as may be ascertained as accurately as the rules themselves.”
Smith contrasts justice with looser virtues by arguing that its external obligations require unusually precise rules if people are to rely on one another.
Source note: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III discussion of the general rules of morality; Smith contrasts exact rules of justice with more flexible rules of prudence and generosity.