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Plato Quotes on Virtue

Browse 6 quotations connecting Plato with Virtue, with meanings, source notes and related themes.

Reading guide

Virtue, wisdom and disputed definitions in Plato

The six passages come from six separately composed works, not six versions of one ethical maxim. In The Republic, Socrates asks whether justice is a kind of excellence of the soul during his examination of Thrasymachus; the dialogue has not yet given a final theory of justice. Near the end of Phaedo, Socrates ties virtue and wisdom to his argument for the soul’s immortality, a contested ancient metaphysical view rather than scientific evidence for an afterlife. In Lysis, he proposes a final object of friendship worthy for its own sake but the inquiry ends without consensus. In Symposium, Eryximachus describes harmonious love through temperance and justice amid a series of competing speeches; this is Eryximachus, not Socrates. The added Meno passage tentatively associates virtue with wisdom, but Socrates subsequently challenges the assumption that virtue is knowledge and asks whether it has teachers. In Protagoras, Socrates instead asks whether justice, temperance and holiness are parts of virtue or alternative names for one quality; Protagoras gives a reply that the argument continues to test. These are translated arguments and questions with distinct dramatic contexts, not uniform rules of conduct, direct autobiographical speech by Plato or laboratory findings.

Sources

Where these virtue quotations appear

Sources represented here include Lysis, Meno, Phaedo.

6 shown
Quotations

6 matching quotations with meanings and source context

Source identified1
And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake of any other or further dear.
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“And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake of any other or further dear.”

Voice: Dialogue speaker · Socrates

Socrates examines whether some cherished thing can be valued for its own sake rather than only because it leads to another benefit. He advances a possible ultimate object of friendship, but the argument immediately faces further questions and the dialogue finishes without an agreed definition. Reading this as a tested hypothesis prevents the line from becoming a misleading slogan about ideal friendship.

Source details

Plato, Lysis, approximately 219c–d, Socrates speaking with Lysis and Menexenus; Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1579. The sentence follows a chain of examples of things desired for other things, and Socrates soon reopens the argument by asking whether friendship depends on evil. It is a provisional dialectical step, not a conclusive formula offered by Plato.

Source identified2
And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?
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“And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?”

Voice: Dialogue speaker · Socrates

Socrates arrives at a conditional suggestion that a good character may depend wholly or partly on wisdom. His question follows a discussion of how judgment guides courage and other qualities toward good outcomes. It is not a final definition: he soon reopens the question by doubting whether virtue can be taught and whether suitable teachers exist.

Source details

Plato, Meno, approximately Stephanus 89a; Socrates is questioning Meno after connecting the usefulness of virtues with wise guidance. The conclusion is provisional and is challenged shortly afterwards when they examine the absence of recognized teachers of virtue. Exact complete sentence in Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1643, dialogue proper (not translator introduction); the historical Plato is not the speaking character.

Source identified3
But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom.
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“But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom.”

Voice: Dialogue speaker · Socrates

Near the end of the Phaedo, Socrates connects the way a person lives with the care and formation of the soul. His claim depends on an argument for immortality advanced inside the dialogue; it is a philosophical and religious position, not a scientific finding about an afterlife.

Source details

Plato, Phaedo, approximately 107c, Socrates addressing his companions after the arguments concerning the soul; Benjamin Jowett English, Gutenberg #1658. This sentence is in the dialogue proper, not the translator introduction. Preserve the surrounding conditional argument about the soul and historical belief in immortality.

Source identified4
Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.
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“Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.”

Voice: Dialogue speaker · Socrates

Socrates challenges Protagoras to clarify whether moral excellences such as justice, temperance and holiness make up different parts of a single virtue or name the same property. The question tests the structure of virtue rather than giving the reader an easy definition. Protagoras proposes an analogy with distinct parts of a face, and their discussion goes on to scrutinize the claim.

Source details

Plato, Protagoras, approximately Stephanus 329c–d; Socrates asks Protagoras about the unity of virtue after the sophist describes civic instruction and the acquisition of good character. Protagoras, not Socrates, answers that its qualities are distinct parts. Exact sentence from Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1591, in the dialogue proper after the opening philosophical and mythic arguments, not in translator commentary.

Source identified5
And the love, more especially, which is concerned with the good, and which is perfected in company with temperance and justice, whether among gods or men, has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and harmony, and makes us friends with the gods who are above us, and with one another.
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“And the love, more especially, which is concerned with the good, and which is perfected in company with temperance and justice, whether among gods or men, has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and harmony, and makes us friends with the gods who are above us, and with one another.”

Voice: Dialogue speaker · Eryximachus

Eryximachus presents an expansive account in which well-ordered love creates harmony between people and even between humanity and the gods. His physician’s speech moves between medicine, music, the seasons and ritual, so friendship is part of an ancient analogy about the balance of opposing forces. It is his contribution to a gathering of competing speeches about love, not a single universally endorsed Platonic doctrine.

Source details

Plato, Symposium, Eryximachus speaking at approximately 188d–e near the end of his encomium of Eros; Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1600. The following exchange passes the speech to Aristophanes; speaker is physician Eryximachus, NOT Socrates. References to divine friendship and cosmology express ancient philosophical and religious views, not contemporary scientific findings.

Source identified6
And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?
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“And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?”

Voice: Dialogue speaker · Socrates

Socrates treats justice as a quality by which a soul performs its work well, rather than simply an advantage in public reputation or trade. This concluding question ties the earlier inquiry about justice to the dialogue’s claim about how people live.

Source details

The Republic, Book I, close of Socrates’s argument with Thrasymachus about the function and excellence of the soul. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1497. It belongs to a provisional exchange that ends with Socrates acknowledging that the inquiry has not fully determined what justice is; it is not a scientific claim about the soul.

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