Plato Quotes on Mind

Plato, Apology, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1656. Socrates says this after examining a politician whom others considered wise; the wording is dialogue speech attributed to Socrates within Plato’s work, not a claim that Socrates knew literally nothing.

Apology 38a; wording varies by translation.

Crito, Benjamin Jowett translation; Socrates responds to Crito’s concern about public opinion while awaiting execution.

Laches, around Stephanus 194e–195a, Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1584. Nicias speaks to Laches after Socrates invites an alternative to Laches’s endurance account; subsequent questioning probes the scope of knowledge about fear and hope and leaves the inquiry unresolved. The local dramatic speaker is Nicias, not Plato personally. The wording occurs in the dialogue body, not Jowett’s introduction.

Laws, Book VII, Benjamin Jowett English translation. The Athenian Stranger asks Cleinias this question as they begin discussing how children should be raised; it is dialogue, not a detached modern prescription for health or schooling.

Meno, around Stephanus 97e–98a, Socrates addressing Meno after the Daedalus-statue comparison. The quoted standalone sentence immediately follows Socrates’s argument that right opinions can guide action but need to be tied down by an account of their cause. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1643. The text and translational phrasing are Jowett’s; the dialogue does not treat every true opinion as worthless.

Phaedo, Benjamin Jowett translation; Socrates asks the question during the dialogue’s argument about visible bodies and the unseen soul.

Phaedo, Benjamin Jowett translation; Socrates is reasoning with Cebes about visibility, mortality and the proposed nature of soul and body.

Phaedo, approximately Stephanus 91b–c, Socrates speaking to Simmias and Cebes after their objections to the arguments about the soul’s survival. He specifically asks them to contradict him if they think his reasoning is wrong. This is a complete sentence from Benjamin Jowett’s English translation, Project Gutenberg #1658, in the dialogue after the translator’s separate introduction. Socrates is a character and local speaker; do not attribute the sentence as a direct personal remark by Plato.

Plato, Phaedo, approximately 65c–d; Socrates speaking with Simmias about the philosopher’s pursuit of true being and the limits of bodily perception. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1658, dramatic text (not the editorial introduction).

Plato, Philebus, approximately 30c–d; Socrates addressing Protarchus amid the argument that reason or mind belongs with the ordering cause rather than with limitless pleasure. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1744, dialogue text.

Symposium, Diotima’s ascent toward beauty as recounted by Socrates, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1600. This is one stage in an ancient philosophical account of beauty and love, not a modern psychological ranking of attractiveness.

Symposium, Socrates recounting Diotima’s teaching, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1600. Diotima is a reported speaker within the dialogue; the passage is philosophical argument about ignorance and desire for wisdom.

The Republic, Book VII, Jowett translation; Socrates argues that education should draw the mind rather than rely only on compulsion.

The Republic, Book V; Socrates places opinion between knowledge and ignorance in the argument about what each apprehends.

Plato, The Republic, Book I, around 344e, Socrates in dialogue with Thrasymachus. Wording verified in Benjamin Jowett, third edition (1888), transcribed in Gutenberg #55201. This is dialogue speech following Thrasymachus’s defence of injustice, not the translator’s prefatory analysis. Edition-specific wording must be preserved.

Plato, The Republic, Book IV, approximately 441e–442a; Socrates addressing Glaucon while contrasting the rational, spirited and appetitive parts of the soul. Exact sentence from Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1497, Book IV main dialogue (not introductory editorial matter). The premise belongs to an ancient account of the soul and remains open to philosophical interpretation; not clinical or neuroscientific evidence.

Plato, Theaetetus, approximately 189e–190a; Socrates responding to Theaetetus on what it means for the mind to conceive something. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1726, main dialogue after the discussion of false belief. The same passage later distinguishes inner speech from externally spoken words.

Theaetetus, around Stephanus 201a–c, Socrates explaining his law-court counterexample while speaking with Theaetetus. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1726. The full sentence is spoken by Socrates in the dramatic dialogue, not from Jowett’s prefatory commentary; no claim is made about modern evidence law.