Plato Quotes on Wisdom

Plato, Apology, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1656. Socrates says this after examining a politician whom others considered wise; the wording is dialogue speech attributed to Socrates within Plato’s work, not a claim that Socrates knew literally nothing.

Apology 38a; wording varies by translation.

Laches, around Stephanus 194e–195a, Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1584. Nicias speaks to Laches after Socrates invites an alternative to Laches’s endurance account; subsequent questioning probes the scope of knowledge about fear and hope and leaves the inquiry unresolved. The local dramatic speaker is Nicias, not Plato personally. The wording occurs in the dialogue body, not Jowett’s introduction.

Laches, roughly Stephanus 192b–c, Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1584. Laches answers Socrates’s attempt to define courage beyond battlefield conduct; Socrates then challenges whether foolish endurance can count as courageous. The local dramatic speaker is Laches, not Socrates or Plato himself. This is a contested proposal inside an unresolved inquiry, not Plato’s stand-alone creed.

Laws, Book II, Benjamin Jowett English translation. The Athenian Stranger opens a longer definition linking early instincts and pleasure or pain with later rational understanding; this quotation preserves the opening clause and its original semicolon.

Laws, Book IX, the Athenian Stranger replying to Cleinias while designing criminal laws for an imagined city. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1750. This is the concluding clause of a longer first-person definition that begins “And now I can define to you clearly”; preserving it as an extract does not make it a remark by Socrates (who is absent from Laws).

Plato, Laws, Book V, the Athenian Stranger giving an extended civic-ethical exhortation to Cleinias and Megillus; Benjamin Jowett English, Gutenberg #1750. This is dialogue speech, not commentary in Jowett’s introduction. The local dramatic voice is the Athenian Stranger, not Socrates or Plato personally.

Plato, Meno, approximately Stephanus 89a; Socrates is questioning Meno after connecting the usefulness of virtues with wise guidance. The conclusion is provisional and is challenged shortly afterwards when they examine the absence of recognized teachers of virtue. Exact complete sentence in Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1643, dialogue proper (not translator introduction); the historical Plato is not the speaking character.

Meno, around Stephanus 97e–98a, Socrates addressing Meno after the Daedalus-statue comparison. The quoted standalone sentence immediately follows Socrates’s argument that right opinions can guide action but need to be tied down by an account of their cause. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1643. The text and translational phrasing are Jowett’s; the dialogue does not treat every true opinion as worthless.

Plato, Phaedo, approximately 107c, Socrates addressing his companions after the arguments concerning the soul; Benjamin Jowett English, Gutenberg #1658. This sentence is in the dialogue proper, not the translator introduction. Preserve the surrounding conditional argument about the soul and historical belief in immortality.

Phaedrus, around Stephanus 245b–c, in Socrates’s second speech (palinode) to Phaedrus following his retraction of the anti-lover argument. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1636; the complete sentence occurs in the dramatic speech after examples of prophetic, religious and poetic inspiration. The divine origin of love is a claim of this ancient philosophical argument, not independently established evidence.

Phaedrus, around Stephanus 249d–e, Socrates’s palinode and description of inspired recollection of true beauty. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1636. This is Socrates speaking in Plato’s dialogue; the claim comes after his charioteer-and-soul allegory and should not be extracted as a universal account of romance.

Symposium, Socrates recounting Diotima’s teaching, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1600. The represented wording belongs to Diotima’s account of Love as intermediate between the wise and the ignorant.

Symposium, Socrates recounting Diotima’s teaching, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1600. Diotima is a reported speaker within the dialogue; the passage is philosophical argument about ignorance and desire for wisdom.

The Republic, Book IV; the statement summarizes a definition developed within Socrates’ argument about the ordered city.

The Republic, Book V; Socrates places opinion between knowledge and ignorance in the argument about what each apprehends.

The Republic, Book I, close of Socrates’s argument with Thrasymachus about the function and excellence of the soul. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1497. It belongs to a provisional exchange that ends with Socrates acknowledging that the inquiry has not fully determined what justice is; it is not a scientific claim about the soul.

Plato, The Republic, Book I, around 344e, Socrates in dialogue with Thrasymachus. Wording verified in Benjamin Jowett, third edition (1888), transcribed in Gutenberg #55201. This is dialogue speech following Thrasymachus’s defence of injustice, not the translator’s prefatory analysis. Edition-specific wording must be preserved.

Theaetetus, around Stephanus 201a–c, Socrates explaining his law-court counterexample while speaking with Theaetetus. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1726. The full sentence is spoken by Socrates in the dramatic dialogue, not from Jowett’s prefatory commentary; no claim is made about modern evidence law.