Plato Quotes: Sources, Meanings & Themes

Apology, Jowett translation; Socrates says he would continue practicing philosophy even if acquittal were conditioned on silence.

Plato, Apology, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1656. Socrates says this after examining a politician whom others considered wise; the wording is dialogue speech attributed to Socrates within Plato’s work, not a claim that Socrates knew literally nothing.

Apology 38a; wording varies by translation.

Apology, final paragraph in Jowett’s translation; Socrates closes after the jury has sentenced him to death.

Apology, Jowett translation; Socrates rejects saving himself through a style of pleading he considers unworthy.

Crito, Benjamin Jowett translation; Socrates is testing the moral premises that will govern his decision about escaping prison.

Crito, Benjamin Jowett translation; Socrates responds to Crito’s concern about public opinion while awaiting execution.

Crito, Socrates questioning Crito during the prison discussion after establishing a rule against retaliation; Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1657. The sentence begins after Socrates says he will put the next point as a question. The question is not an unqualified defense of obedience to every law; the dialogue stages an argument about obligations to the city.

Plato, Crito, approximately 48b, Socrates speaking with Crito in prison; Benjamin Jowett public-domain English, Gutenberg #1657. The conditional question occurs in the dramatic text after a discussion of justice, public opinion and fear of execution. Socrates is the dramatic speaker; it is not a recorded autobiographical quotation by Plato.

Plato, Gorgias, approximately Stephanus 491d–e, Socrates answering Callicles’s question about ruling oneself. Callicles promptly disputes the value of temperance. Full sentence in Benjamin Jowett’s English translation, Project Gutenberg #1672, within the Gorgias dialogue proper (not Jowett’s introductory essay). Socrates is the local dramatic speaker; the line is not Plato’s autobiographical speech. An ancient ethical argument, not experimental mental-health evidence.

Laches, around Stephanus 194e–195a, Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1584. Nicias speaks to Laches after Socrates invites an alternative to Laches’s endurance account; subsequent questioning probes the scope of knowledge about fear and hope and leaves the inquiry unresolved. The local dramatic speaker is Nicias, not Plato personally. The wording occurs in the dialogue body, not Jowett’s introduction.

Laches, roughly Stephanus 192b–c, Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1584. Laches answers Socrates’s attempt to define courage beyond battlefield conduct; Socrates then challenges whether foolish endurance can count as courageous. The local dramatic speaker is Laches, not Socrates or Plato himself. This is a contested proposal inside an unresolved inquiry, not Plato’s stand-alone creed.

Laws, Book I, Benjamin Jowett English translation. The Athenian Stranger says this while explaining why childhood play and practical imitation should prepare future capacities; it is a program of civic upbringing, not a present-day evidence-based educational standard.

Laws, Book V, Benjamin Jowett English translation. Explicit excerpt: an ellipsis omits the intervening phrase about domestic economy, politics and the arts; the surrounding passage praises arithmetic while warning against separating skill from moral aims.

Laws, Book VII, Benjamin Jowett English translation. The Athenian Stranger asks Cleinias this question as they begin discussing how children should be raised; it is dialogue, not a detached modern prescription for health or schooling.

Laws, Book II, Benjamin Jowett English translation. The Athenian Stranger opens a longer definition linking early instincts and pleasure or pain with later rational understanding; this quotation preserves the opening clause and its original semicolon.

Laws, Book IX, the Athenian Stranger replying to Cleinias while designing criminal laws for an imagined city. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1750. This is the concluding clause of a longer first-person definition that begins “And now I can define to you clearly”; preserving it as an extract does not make it a remark by Socrates (who is absent from Laws).

Plato, Laws, Book V, the Athenian Stranger giving an extended civic-ethical exhortation to Cleinias and Megillus; Benjamin Jowett English, Gutenberg #1750. This is dialogue speech, not commentary in Jowett’s introduction. The local dramatic voice is the Athenian Stranger, not Socrates or Plato personally.

Plato, Lysis, approximately 219c–d, Socrates speaking with Lysis and Menexenus; Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1579. The sentence follows a chain of examples of things desired for other things, and Socrates soon reopens the argument by asking whether friendship depends on evil. It is a provisional dialectical step, not a conclusive formula offered by Plato.

Lysis, around Stephanus 221e, Socrates addressing Lysis and Menexenus while exploring desire, affinity and friendship. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1579. The dialogue goes on to challenge whether the congenial is simply the like and ends without reaching a settled definition; do not present the tentative argument as an unconditional fact.

Plato, Lysis, around 211e–212a (opening inquiry into friendship), Socrates addressing Menexenus; Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1579, dramatic text after Menexenus rejoins the discussion. Gold of Darius is a historical royal-wealth comparison and Socrates goes on to question what it means to be a friend. Do not attribute this speech to Plato as personal autobiography.

Plato, Meno, approximately Stephanus 89a; Socrates is questioning Meno after connecting the usefulness of virtues with wise guidance. The conclusion is provisional and is challenged shortly afterwards when they examine the absence of recognized teachers of virtue. Exact complete sentence in Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1643, dialogue proper (not translator introduction); the historical Plato is not the speaking character.

Meno, around Stephanus 97e–98a, Socrates addressing Meno after the Daedalus-statue comparison. The quoted standalone sentence immediately follows Socrates’s argument that right opinions can guide action but need to be tied down by an account of their cause. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1643. The text and translational phrasing are Jowett’s; the dialogue does not treat every true opinion as worthless.

Phaedo, Benjamin Jowett translation; Socrates asks the question during the dialogue’s argument about visible bodies and the unseen soul.

Phaedo, Benjamin Jowett translation; Socrates is reasoning with Cebes about visibility, mortality and the proposed nature of soul and body.

Plato, Phaedo, approximately 107c, Socrates addressing his companions after the arguments concerning the soul; Benjamin Jowett English, Gutenberg #1658. This sentence is in the dialogue proper, not the translator introduction. Preserve the surrounding conditional argument about the soul and historical belief in immortality.

Phaedo, approximately Stephanus 91b–c, Socrates speaking to Simmias and Cebes after their objections to the arguments about the soul’s survival. He specifically asks them to contradict him if they think his reasoning is wrong. This is a complete sentence from Benjamin Jowett’s English translation, Project Gutenberg #1658, in the dialogue after the translator’s separate introduction. Socrates is a character and local speaker; do not attribute the sentence as a direct personal remark by Plato.

Plato, Phaedo, approximately 65c–d; Socrates speaking with Simmias about the philosopher’s pursuit of true being and the limits of bodily perception. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1658, dramatic text (not the editorial introduction).

Phaedrus, approximately Stephanus 256d–e, Socrates’s second speech contrasting the self-controlled philosophical lovers with another pair moved more by ambition and desire. Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1636. The sentence belongs to the second pair, NOT the ideal self-controlled pair, which matters to its meaning; these are a philosophical narrator’s words, not a romantic pledge made by Plato.

Phaedrus, around Stephanus 245b–c, in Socrates’s second speech (palinode) to Phaedrus following his retraction of the anti-lover argument. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1636; the complete sentence occurs in the dramatic speech after examples of prophetic, religious and poetic inspiration. The divine origin of love is a claim of this ancient philosophical argument, not independently established evidence.

Phaedrus, around Stephanus 249d–e, Socrates’s palinode and description of inspired recollection of true beauty. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1636. This is Socrates speaking in Plato’s dialogue; the claim comes after his charioteer-and-soul allegory and should not be extracted as a universal account of romance.

Plato, Philebus, approximately 30c–d; Socrates addressing Protarchus amid the argument that reason or mind belongs with the ordering cause rather than with limitless pleasure. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1744, dialogue text.

Plato, Protagoras, approximately Stephanus 329c–d; Socrates asks Protagoras about the unity of virtue after the sophist describes civic instruction and the acquisition of good character. Protagoras, not Socrates, answers that its qualities are distinct parts. Exact sentence from Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1591, in the dialogue proper after the opening philosophical and mythic arguments, not in translator commentary.

Symposium, Diotima’s ascent toward beauty as recounted by Socrates, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1600. This is one stage in an ancient philosophical account of beauty and love, not a modern psychological ranking of attractiveness.

Symposium, Aristophanes’s speech, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1600. The sentence concludes the comic myth of humans split into halves; it is a speaker position inside Plato’s dialogue, not direct autobiography or anthropology by Plato.

Symposium, Socrates recounting Diotima’s teaching, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1600. The represented wording belongs to Diotima’s account of Love as intermediate between the wise and the ignorant.

Symposium, Socrates recounting Diotima’s teaching, Benjamin Jowett translation, Project Gutenberg #1600. Diotima is a reported speaker within the dialogue; the passage is philosophical argument about ignorance and desire for wisdom.

Plato, Symposium, Eryximachus speaking at approximately 188d–e near the end of his encomium of Eros; Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1600. The following exchange passes the speech to Aristophanes; speaker is physician Eryximachus, NOT Socrates. References to divine friendship and cosmology express ancient philosophical and religious views, not contemporary scientific findings.

The Republic, Book II, Benjamin Jowett translation. The retained catalog wording is a shortened common form of Jowett’s longer sentence, “the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tender thing”; it should not be presented as a verbatim full sentence from the represented edition.

The Republic, Book IV; the statement summarizes a definition developed within Socrates’ argument about the ordered city.

The Republic, Book VII, Jowett translation; Socrates argues that education should draw the mind rather than rely only on compulsion.

The Republic, Book III, Jowett translation; the passage connects musical and literary form with simplicity of character.

The Republic, Book IV in Benjamin Jowett’s translation; the line appears during discussion of education and civic character.

The Republic, Book V; Socrates places opinion between knowledge and ignorance in the argument about what each apprehends.

The Republic, Book I, close of Socrates’s argument with Thrasymachus about the function and excellence of the soul. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1497. It belongs to a provisional exchange that ends with Socrates acknowledging that the inquiry has not fully determined what justice is; it is not a scientific claim about the soul.

The Republic, Book I, Socrates replying to Polemarchus in the examination of the maxim that justice helps friends and harms enemies. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1497. The source presents a question in dialogue, not a standalone personal motto from Plato; the moral argument considers whether hurting someone can make that person better.

Plato, The Republic, Book I, around 344e, Socrates in dialogue with Thrasymachus. Wording verified in Benjamin Jowett, third edition (1888), transcribed in Gutenberg #55201. This is dialogue speech following Thrasymachus’s defence of injustice, not the translator’s prefatory analysis. Edition-specific wording must be preserved.

Plato, The Republic, Book IV, approximately 441e–442a; Socrates addressing Glaucon while contrasting the rational, spirited and appetitive parts of the soul. Exact sentence from Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1497, Book IV main dialogue (not introductory editorial matter). The premise belongs to an ancient account of the soul and remains open to philosophical interpretation; not clinical or neuroscientific evidence.

Plato, Theaetetus, approximately 189e–190a; Socrates responding to Theaetetus on what it means for the mind to conceive something. Benjamin Jowett English, Project Gutenberg #1726, main dialogue after the discussion of false belief. The same passage later distinguishes inner speech from externally spoken words.

Theaetetus, around Stephanus 201a–c, Socrates explaining his law-court counterexample while speaking with Theaetetus. Benjamin Jowett English translation, Project Gutenberg #1726. The full sentence is spoken by Socrates in the dramatic dialogue, not from Jowett’s prefatory commentary; no claim is made about modern evidence law.