Cicero Quotes: Sources, Meanings & Themes
Browse quotations by Cicero with named works, context notes, meanings and recurring themes.
Focused topic collections for Cicero
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“No one is so old as to think that he may not live a year.”
Even late in life people naturally continue to imagine a future, which helps explain why worthwhile work and planning do not simply stop with age.
Source details
Cato on Old Age, Shuckburgh translation, in a passage about older people planting for those who come after them.
“For of course rashness is the note of youth, prudence of old age.”
The contrast assigns different characteristic strengths to stages of life, valuing experience for the restraint and judgment it can develop.
Source details
Cato on Old Age, Shuckburgh translation.
“The course of life is fixed, and nature admits of its being run but in one way, and only once.”
Each stage of life occurs only once, so wisdom includes accepting its appropriate strengths instead of endlessly trying to restore an earlier stage.
Source details
Cato on Old Age, Shuckburgh translation, in Cicero’s discussion of the distinctive advantages of each season of life.
“You should use what you have, and whatever you may chance to be doing, do it with all your might.”
Capability should be judged by the resources actually available now, then used fully instead of being measured only against a younger or stronger self.
Source details
Cato on Old Age, in Cicero’s answer to the complaint that age reduces physical strength.
“A true friend is, as it were, another self.”
The phrase captures the intimacy of friendship: another person becomes close enough that concern for them resembles concern for oneself.
Source details
De Amicitia, chapter 21 / classical section 80, Andrew P. Peabody translation, Project Gutenberg #7491. Laelius says that unless self-love is transferred into friendship a true friend cannot be found, “for such a friend is, as it were, another self.” The familiar another-self formulation is presented in its philosophical context and not as a literal identity claim.
“Friendship springs from nature rather than from need.”
Friendship is not reduced to usefulness; Cicero argues that it arises from natural affection before calculations of advantage.
Source details
De Amicitia, chapter 8 / classical section 27, Andrew P. Peabody translation, Project Gutenberg #7491. Laelius argues that friendship springs from nature rather than need and from an inclination of the mind with consciousness of love rather than calculation of utility. This is Cicero’s philosophical position voiced through Laelius, not modern social-science evidence.
“Friendship has more advantages than I can easily name.”
The value of friendship is intentionally left larger than a checklist, because companionship affects many parts of life at once.
Source details
De Amicitia, chapter 6 / classical section 22, Andrew P. Peabody translation, Project Gutenberg #7491. “Friendship has more advantages than I can easily name” introduces Laelius’ catalogue of the many uses and consolations of friendship; the open-ended praise remains rhetorical/philosophical rather than a quantified claim about relationship outcomes.
“Firm, steadfast, self-consistent men are to be chosen as friends.”
Reliable friendship depends on reliable character; steadiness matters because trust cannot grow when conduct constantly changes with advantage.
Source details
De Amicitia, chapter 17 / classical section 62, Andrew P. Peabody translation, Project Gutenberg #7491. “Firm, steadfast, self-consistent men are to be chosen as friends” follows Laelius’ recollection of Scipio’s concern that people test possessions more carefully than friendships. The counsel remains ancient character ethics rather than a diagnostic rule for evaluating people.
“Such friendship at once enhances the lustre of prosperity, and by dividing and sharing adversity lessens its burden.”
A good friend does not matter only in crisis: companionship can enlarge good fortune while also making hardship easier to carry because difficulty is no longer borne alone.
Source details
De Amicitia, chapter 6 / classical section 22, Andrew P. Peabody translation, Project Gutenberg #7491. “Such friendship at once enhances the lustre of prosperity, and by dividing and sharing adversity lessens its burden” closes Laelius’ contrast between ordinary association and true/perfect friendship. The sentence remains ancient ethical rhetoric rather than a guaranteed psychological effect of companionship.
“Friendship is nothing else than entire fellow feeling as to all things human and divine with mutual good-will and affection.”
Cicero defines the strongest friendship as a broad sharing of concern, judgment and goodwill rather than a narrow exchange of favors or useful contacts.
Source details
De Amicitia (Laelius de Amicitia), chapter 6 / classical section 20, Andrew P. Peabody translation, Project Gutenberg #7491. Laelius defines friendship as entire fellow feeling in human and divine things joined with mutual goodwill and affection. Cicero remains the work author while Gaius Laelius is the local dialogue speaker; this is ancient ethical-philosophical argument rather than a modern empirical definition of friendship.
“Good-will is won principally through kind services.”
Trust and affection are more likely to grow from useful conduct toward others than from reputation management alone.
Source details
De Officiis, Book II, section 32; Cicero lists kind services among the strongest ways of earning goodwill.
“No duty is more imperative than that of proving one's gratitude.”
Gratitude is framed as an obligation to recognize and answer benefits already received, not merely as a pleasant feeling toward a benefactor.
Source details
De Officiis, Book I, section 47; Cicero discusses how kindness already received creates a stronger duty of requital.
“For we have confidence in those who we think have more understanding than ourselves”
Cicero treats confidence in another person as partly a judgment about competence: people are more willing to rely on someone they believe can understand difficult circumstances and reach sound decisions.
Source details
De Officiis, Book II, section 33, Project Gutenberg #47001. Cicero’s larger argument says public confidence depends on practical wisdom joined with justice; intelligence alone is not presented as sufficient for trust.
“The foundation of justice, moreover, is good faith—that is, truth and fidelity to promises and agreements.”
Justice depends on reliable commitments because social cooperation becomes unstable when promises and agreements are treated as optional whenever they become inconvenient.
Source details
De Officiis, Book I, section 23; Cicero defines good faith through truth and fidelity to promises and agreements.
“The greatest privilege of wealth is, beyond all peradventure, the opportunity it affords for doing good, without sacrificing one’s fortune.”
Wealth is given ethical value when it creates capacity to help others sustainably rather than serving only accumulation, display, or personal appetite.
Source details
De Officiis, Book II, section 64; Cicero discusses generosity while also warning against careless management of one’s property.
“Is not prosperity robbed of half its value if you have no one to share your joy?”
Good fortune becomes more meaningful when it can be shared, making companionship part of the value of prosperity itself.
Source details
Laelius on Friendship; the surrounding passage pairs shared joy with support during misfortune.
“What can be more delightful than to have some one to whom you can say everything with the same absolute confidence as to yourself?”
Close friendship creates a rare space for frank speech because confidence in the other person removes the need for continual self-protection.
Source details
Laelius on Friendship, translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh in Project Gutenberg’s Treatises on Friendship and Old Age.
“You might just as well take the sun out of the sky as friendship from life; for the immortal gods have given us nothing better or more delightful.”
Friendship is treated not as an optional ornament but as one of the basic goods that makes ordinary life worth inhabiting.
Source details
Laelius on Friendship, Shuckburgh translation.
“Regard friendship as the greatest thing in the world; for there is nothing which so fits in with our nature, or is so exactly what we want in prosperity or adversity.”
Cicero presents friendship as suited to human nature because it serves both celebration and hardship rather than belonging to only one circumstance.
Source details
Laelius on Friendship; Laelius frames friendship as useful and natural in both good and difficult times.
“For I now call a freedom from anxiety a security, on which freedom a happy life depends.”
Cicero treats inner security as freedom from destabilizing anxiety, making mental steadiness an important condition of a genuinely happy and self-directed life.
Source details
Tusculan Disputations, Book V, section XIV, represented by Project Gutenberg #14988. Cicero defines security parenthetically as freedom from anxiety while arguing that a happy life must rest on stable goods and virtue rather than vulnerable externals. It remains ancient philosophical psychology mediated by translation, not modern clinical anxiety-treatment evidence.